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Abstract
The theory of retribution is a central tenet in Malawian sen-
tencing jurisprudence. Courts have given expression to retri-
bution in various ways, most conspicuously through the rec-
ognition of the principle of proportionality as the most
important principle in sentencing. Retribution has perme-
ated courts’ consideration of certain sentencing factors such
as the seriousness of the offence, family obligations and
public opinion. Overall, retribution rightly plays a pivotal
role in Malawian sentencing jurisprudence by elevating the
principle of proportionality to the most important principle
in sentencing. Malawian courts have also noted that wheth-
er in pursuit of retribution or utilitarianism, the ultimate
objective is to arrive at a sentence that is just and fair in
relation to the crime and the offender. This also ensures that
the sentence imposed does not offend the prohibition of
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.
Keywords: sentencing, retribution, just deserts, punishment,
Malawi
1 Introduction
The justification for punishment invokes three key
questions: why punish? Who should be punished? How
much? Theories of punishment fall into two groups:
utilitarian and retributivist.1 Utilitarian theories are
more concerned with preventing future crime while
retributivist theories focus on the past; that is, punish-
ment as being deserved by offenders. Utilitarian theo-
ries include deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilita-
tion. Oftentimes, penal systems exhibit a blend of these
justifications. This article seeks to examine the judicial
application of retribution in Malawi by analysing sen-
tence decisions in which courts have alluded to retribu-
tive principles. It commences with a summary of the
theory of retribution, then considers the role of the aims
of punishment in Malawi generally. The article then
turns to case law dealing with the sentencing of adult
offenders to understand how retribution is applied in
practice.
* Esther Gumboh is a postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Cape
Town, South Africa.
1. B.A. Hudson, Understanding Justice: An Introduction to the Ideas, Per-
spectives and Controversies in Modern Penal Theory (1996), at 1.
2 Understanding Retribution
Although there are various versions of retribution,2 the
theory of retribution is generally based on four basic
claims: the principle of wilful wrongdoing, the principle
of proportionality, the principle of necessity, and the
principle of inherent justice. The principle of blame-
worthiness or wilful wrongdoing holds that the justifica-
tion for punishment is the blameworthiness of an
offender who willingly commits an offence. The princi-
ple of proportionality is an essential consequence of the
theory of retribution as it is based on the principle of
just deserts. It demands that punishment must fit the
crime; that is, the quantum of suffering inflicted on the
offender should be proportional to the gravity of the
crime. In determining the severity of punishment, a
court must look to the moral culpability of the offender
and the seriousness of the offence. Serious offences
should be punished more severely than minor offences
to reflect the moral gravity of the offences.3 The gravity
of an offence can be gleaned from the harm it causes and
the moral culpability of the offender. Considerations
external to the offence should have a minimal role, if
any, in determining the punishment. Therefore, factors
such as the prospect of rehabilitation, a plea of guilt,
character, cooperation with the state, and prior convic-
tions should not be major considerations in sentencing.
Kant invoked the principle of just desert as the only
principle that can ensure proportionality in sentencing
and should be the basis for punishment.4
The third principle of retribution is the intrinsic good-
ness of punishment. Punishment is seen as justified in
2. Retribution includes the repayment theory, desert theory, penalty theo-
ry, minimalism, satisfaction theory, fair play theory, placation theory,
annulment theory and denunciation theory: see J. Cottingham, ‘Varie-
ties of Retribution’, 29 Philosophical Quarterly 238 (1979); N. Walker,
‘Even More Varieties of Retribution’, 74(29) Philosophy 595 (1999).
3. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in Philosophy
(1968), at 234.
4. I. Kant, ‘The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon’, in M. Tonry (ed.), Why
Punish? How Much? A Reader on Punishment (2010) 31, at 32. The
principle of lex talionis or ‘an eye for an eye’ has been attacked as a
‘barbaric law of retaliation in kind’. However, this criticism is based on a
mistaken understanding that the principle demands that an offender
should suffer the same harm that he has caused the victim, a conclusion
that can understandably be drawn from a literal reading of the principle.
Kant did not use the principle in this literal sense: see generally M.J.
Fish, ‘An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punish-
ment’, 28(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 57 (2008).
175
Esther Gumboh doi: 10.5553/ELR.000087 - ELR December 2017 | No. 3
itself. Kant5 and Packer6 therefore consider that while
other goods may be derived from punishment, they
must not be pursued for their own sake. Lastly, the
principle of necessity stipulates that punishment is
obligatory and that a state has a right to punish offend-
ers. Other scholars have even argued that the moral cul-
pability of an offender gives rise to a ‘duty to punish’7
and that offenders have ‘a right to be punished’.8
The theory of retribution has its strengths and weak-
nesses. It is correct that the basis for punishment is real-
ly the fact that a person has wilfully committed a wrong
and that punishment must be proportional to the gravity
of the crime. The principle of proportionality is recog-
nised as a central concept in sentencing that has been
embraced in several international instruments and
national constitutions. It ‘is rooted in the rule of law,
legal safeguards and guarantees against the excessive use
of force’ that effectively prohibit misuse and arbitrari-
ness of punishments.9 Retribution does however have its
difficulties.
For instance, retribution ignores the external factors
that account for criminality such as poverty, disadvant-
age and discrimination, upbringing and unemployment.
Moreover, the desire to punish does not in itself justify
punishment: the fact ‘that wrongdoing necessarily
prompts a punitive impulse, does not make intrinsic
retributivism a justification for punishment’. There are
situations where a court may decide not to convict, let
alone impose punishment, despite the fact that an
offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In
short, retribution does not provide a general justifying
aim for punishment but only its distributive principles;
namely that only the guilty should be punished, and
only in proportion to the gravity of their crime.10
A further criticism of retribution is its rejection of the
consequences of punishment as a crucial part of the jus-
tification for punishment. While it is important to
ensure that punishment is kept within the limits of the
principle of proportionality, the challenge is ensuring
how other goals like crime prevention can be achieved
with due respect to the rights of offenders including the
5. Kant, above n. 4, at 31-32.
6. H.L. Packer, ‘Theories of Punishment and Correction: What Is the Func-
tion of Prison?’, in L. Orland (ed.), Justice, Punishment, Treatment: The
Correctional Process (1973) 183, at 184.
7. M. Moore, ‘The Moral Worth of Retribution’, in A. von Hirsch and A.
Ashworth (eds.), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy
(1998), 150. R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (1986), at 70; M.R.
Gardner, ‘Rethinking Robinson v. California in the Wake of Jones v.
Los Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by Attending
to “Punishment”’, 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 429
(2008), at 480.
8. See, for instance, H. Morris, ‘Persons and Punishment’, in J. Feinberg
and H. Gross (eds.), Punishment: Selected Readings (1975) 74, at 83;
M.R. Gardner, ‘The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some
Implications of Treating Kids as Persons’, 68(1) Nebraska Law Review
182 (1989); M.R. Gardner, ‘The Right to be Punished: A Suggested
Constitutional Theory’, 33 Rutgers Law Review 838 (1981).
9. T. Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline
of the Repressive Model’, in Tonry, above n. 4, 239, at 240.
10. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’, in Tonry,
above n. 4, 195 at 202-203; J. Jacobs, ‘Luck and Retribution’, 74(4)
Philosophy 535 (1999).
right to human dignity. In this regard, Kant’s observa-
tion that offenders must not be used merely as a means
to an end is instructive. It entails that the severity of
punishment must not be detached from the gravity of
the offence; that punishment must not be imposed sim-
ply to achieve some benefit such as community protec-
tion or deterrence. This is consistent with the right to
human dignity and, to some extent, the right to liberty
in cases where imprisonment or any punishment that
involves restriction of liberty is imposed.
Retribution has also been criticised for its failure to
clearly define proportionality. As noted by Frase,
‘excessiveness and disproportionality are meaningless
concepts in the absence of a clearly defined and defensi-
ble normative framework’.11 To understand the princi-
ple of proportionality, ‘it is necessary to determine the
factors that are relevant to the seriousness of the offence
and how offence severity should be gauged’.12 A further
challenge to proportionality is the inconsistent treat-
ment of aggravating and mitigating factors in sentenc-
ing. The legislature and the courts should strive to treat
these factors consistently and to develop standards as to
when particular forms of punishment may or may not be
imposed. For instance, imprisonment, regardless of its
duration, is generally considered a severe form of pun-
ishment. Minor offences should not attract imprison-
ment.
Considering the above discussion, retribution must be
relegated to a distributive principle of punishment,
whereby it acts as a guide on the quantum of punish-
ment; punishment must at the least reflect the gravity of
an offence and the circumstances of an offender. This is
based on an understanding that the principle of propor-
tionality is a limiting principle, providing for an upper
limit on punishment while leaving room for judicial dis-
cretion in determining the actual sentence imposed in
each case. This allows a court to ponder other consider-
ations when sentencing while being restrained on the
maximum punishment it can impose.13
It is apposite at this point to consider more generally the
role of the aims of punishment in Malawian case law
before focusing on retribution. Thereafter, the article
focusses on the way retribution finds expression in
Malawian sentencing jurisprudence including whether
and how the weaknesses of retribution identified mani-
fest.
11. R.S. Frase, ‘Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State
Constitutions’, 11(1) Journal of Constitutional Law 39 (2008), at 40.
12. M. Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (2001),
at 164.
13. See N. Morris, ‘Desert as a Limiting Principle’, in von Hirsch and Ash-
worth (eds.), above n. 7, 180, at 184: ‘The concept of desert defines
relationships between crime and punishments on a continuum between
the unduly lenient and the excessively punitive within which the just
sentence may on other grounds be determined’.
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3 The Role of the Aims of
Punishment in Sentencing
The justifications for punishment are of judicial and
legislative relevance and have important policy implica-
tions.14 They not only inform sentencing principles and
practices but also determine the nature and severity of
sentences.15 The goals of punishment are also relevant
in the execution of sentences and therefore affect post-
sentence procedures such as parole. Malawi has a hybrid
penal system that recognises all the traditional aims of
punishment: retribution, deterrence, community pro-
tection (incapacitation) and rehabilitation. This hybrid
approach is evident in the forms of punishment availa-
ble. The law provides for, among others, the death pen-
alty, imprisonment, fines, probation, community service
and police supervision. The hybrid approach is also evi-
dent in how courts rationalise their choice of punish-
ment. Imprisonment remains largely used for communi-
ty protection and deterrence while rehabilitation is
deemed suitable for young and first offenders. This sees
courts exercising greater mercy to first and young
offenders, opting for non-custodial sentences or short
terms of imprisonment where the offence is very seri-
ous.
However, there seems to be some inconsistency as to the
proper role of the aims of punishment during the sen-
tencing process. The Magistrate’s Court Sentencing
Guidelines16 state that the seriousness of the offence
must be assessed before a court decides the aim of pun-
ishment in a particular case. This suggests that the deci-
sion as to which aim(s) of punishment to pursue must be
informed by the seriousness of an offence. Writing in
1997, Chimasula Phiri J was of the view that the aims of
a sentence must be the first decision to make in sentenc-
ing.17 However, in the 2013 case of Rep v. Kufandiko,18
Mwaungulu J decided that public interest considera-
tions regarding the aims of punishment should only
come into play after the right sentence has been identi-
fied. Similarly, Rep v. Keke19 held that the goals of pun-
14. See C.C. Spohn, How Do Judges Decide? The Search for Fairness and
Justice in Punishment (2008), at 23-30.
15. S. D’Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN Ad Hoc
Tribunals and Future Perspectives for the ICC (2011), at 33.
16. Malawi Judiciary Magistrate’s Court Sentencing Guidelines (2007),
hereafter Sentencing Guidelines.
17. Justice Chimasula-Phiri, ‘Sentencing Made Simple: A Practical
Approach’, Proceedings of a Malawi Judiciary Workshop on ‘Bail and
Sentencing’ (1997), at 9.
18. Rep v. Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009.
19. Rep v. Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010.
ishment (‘public goals’) must be the last factor to con-
sider when sentencing.20
Since the factors that a court considers in sentencing
and the weight attached to them is intricately linked to
traditional theories of punishment, it is insignificant
whether chronologically the aims of punishment are
considered first or last in the sentencing process.
Indeed, even where a court does not make specific refer-
ence to a particular theory of punishment, as is often the
case in Malawi, the factors used in arriving at the sen-
tence are the key to identifying the underlying rationale
for the sentence imposed. Therefore, the aims of pun-
ishment are always the framework within which a sen-
tence is imposed; the only difference is that courts will
vary as to the emphasis they place on particular factors
and, by implication, the theories of punishment they
employ. It is this variance in emphasis that determines
the quantum of punishment in the end.
Courts have drawn a clear distinction between the aims
of punishment and sentencing principles. For instance,
in Rep v. Phiri,21 the accused, a first and young offend-
er, was sentenced to seven years for the theft of three
cows. The aim of the sentence was purportedly reforma-
tion of the offender. It was held on appeal that the sen-
tence reflected confusion between the purpose of a sen-
tence and sentencing. The court noted that the purpose
of a sentence helps little in arriving at an appropriate
sentence in a particular case. It found that the sentence
was disproportionate in the circumstances and also in
the light of sentences imposed in more serious cases.
This judgment reveals that courts are wary of overem-
phasising the purposes of a sentence in the sentencing
process as this might lead to a situation where the cir-
cumstances of the offender are overlooked or overem-
phasised. This would result in sentences that are either
too lenient or too severe. Rep v. Phiri also reveals the
centrality of proportionality in sentencing. Indeed, the
High Court has warned that regardless of its purported
objective, a sentence must be imposed in the context of
a just and fair punishment in relation to the crime and
the offender that does not offend the prohibition of
cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.22 It is
important to remember that sentencing principles
derive from the aims of punishment.
Proportionality continues to be recognised as the para-
mount principle in sentencing and is therefore generally
regarded as cutting across all other justifications of pun-
ishment. In Rep v. Nangwiya,23 the court held that ‘the
20. Rep v. Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 3-4: ‘Over all, in con-
sidering whether the sentence is cruel inhuman or degrading, the appel-
late court will investigate if the sentence fits the offence (crime), the
victim, the offender, and the public interest or public goals. Courts sen-
tencing at first instance must carefully examine these four heads of sen-
tence and treat them in this order. In practical sentencing, the sentencer
must operate in this order. This sequencing is more likely to produce
uniform and fair sentences after properly considering factors exogenous
to the crimes that are determinative of final disposal of the crime and
the offender’.
21. Rep v. Phiri [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC).
22. Rep v. Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, 8.
23. Rep v. Nangwiya Confirmation Case No 608 of 1997.
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sentence passed must be just to the offender, the offence
and the victim and should reflect the public interest in
prevention of crime’. Rep v. Nkhoma24 also held:
It is not proper that the court, to achieve any of the
purposes of sentencing, retribution, deterrence, inca-
pacitation, reformation and rehabilitation, should
compromise principles of sentencing. Principles of
sentencing are different from purposes of sentencing.
Normally the purposes of sentencing do not assist the
court in arriving at the appropriate quantum of a sen-
tence. An appropriate sentence must achieve propor-
tionality, equality and restraint. The sentence must
be equal to the crime committed, ensure that offend-
ers of equal culpability are treated alike and must not
connote vengeance.
Courts have also linked proportionality to the prohibi-
tion of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment. The High Court has stated that long senten-
ces that are disproportionate to the personal circumstan-
ces of an offender violate the fundamental right not to
be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment.25 In
Rep v. Pose,26 it held that whether a violation had occur-
red would depend on the circumstances of the offence
and comparable sentences both for an aggravated form
of the offence and more serious offences.
4 Retribution in Malawian
Sentencing Jurisprudence
The central principle of retribution is that the punish-
ment must fit the seriousness of the crime and the
blameworthiness of the offender. Retribution is widely
employed as a justification for punishment in Malawi.
While reference to the word ‘retribution’ itself is rare,
sentencing courts have referred to notions of retributive
justice in their sentencing judgments. For instance, they
often make subtle reference to the notion of just deserts
by stating that an offender ‘deserves’ a particular pun-
ishment. Retribution is also evident in that ‘young’
24. Rep v. Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996.
25. Rep v. Pose [1997] 2 MLR 95 (HC).
26. Rep v. Pose [1997] 2 MLR 95 (HC).
offenders are generally treated with mitigation.27 This is
because they are regarded as being less blameworthy,
committing crimes due to peer pressure, impetuousness,
immaturity, youth or adventure.28
The seriousness of the offence is the most determinative
factor in sentencing and indeed in the decision to
imprison. Courts have prescribed that serious offences
must be punished with long and immediate imprison-
ment in order to send the right message to society,29 to
mark the gravity and public disapproval of the offence,
and to punish the offender.30 It was stated in Rep v.
27. Mzungu v. Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 21 of 2007; Rep v. Banda
Confirmation Case No 359 of 2012; Rep v. Yasin Confirmation Case No
219 of 2012. The definition of a ‘young’ offender is fluid because it is
not fixed to a specific age or age range: see Asekwe v. Rep Criminal
Appeal No 59 of 2000 (offenders aged 27 and 28 years); Matewere v.
Rep Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2005 (23-year-old offender); Rep v. Phiri
Confirmation Case No 430 of 2003; Patel v. Rep (23-year-old offend-
er); Rep v. Kachule Confirmation Case No 234 of 2001; Nzabva v. Rep
Criminal Appeal 6 of 2007 (21-year-old offender); Phiri v. Rep Criminal
Appeal No 111 of 2006 (21-year-old offender); Rep v. Magombo Con-
firmation Case No 264 of 2011 (23 years young); Rep v. Chatepa Con-
firmation Case No 822 of 2004. In some cases, older offenders aged
between 30 and 40 years have also been regarded as young offenders:
see for instance Sipiliyano v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of 1998 (34
years); Rep v. Mtendere Confirmation Case No 310 of 210 (34 years);
Chanza v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 170 of 2005 (36 years ‘very
young’); S v. Mbale Criminal Case Number 32 of 2008 (32-year-old
‘fairly young’). Rep v. Magombo Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011
(offender 35 years); Rep v. Mtendere Confirmation Case No 310 of 210
(offender 34 years); Namizinga v. Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 18 of
2007 (22 years old); Namboya v. Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 14 of
2005 (28 years ‘fairly young’) Rep v. Malizani Criminal Case No 219 of
2010, 5 (35 years not youthful age but may be taken beneficial to first
offender as he has lived long without legal blemish); Rep v. Masamba
Confirmation Case No 411 of 2013 (28-year-old offender). In Rep v.
Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010, the court attempted to
expound some general principles to govern the treatment of age in sen-
tencing which can be summarised as follows: Offenders below the age
of 25 years should be punished with short and quick sentences because
at this age involvement in crime may be due to ‘impetuous, immaturity,
youth or adventure. A severe sentence may be perceived by a young
offender as reflecting a harsh society on which to avenge. Long prison
sentences for young persons may actually delay social integration to
enable a young life to start a new life and lead a meaningful life. For
young offenders, therefore, a short, quick and sharp sentence may ach-
ieve the ends of justice and deter future offending’. However, offenders
above 25 years are considered to be mature enough to refrain from
criminal behaviour based on a proper understanding of the consequen-
ces of crime. This means that on the one hand, such offenders deserve
‘a full rigour of the sentence that fits the crime’. On the other hand, a
court may be lenient in such cases because an offender has lived long
without committing crime and therefore less likely to reoffend. Conse-
quently, offenders aged above 25 may also be punished with ‘short and
quick sentences’. Here again the reason is that elderly offenders are less
likely to reoffend. Sentencers must seriously consider suspending sen-
tences for offenders aged 61 years and above. However, it appears that
a court will not exercise leniency unless the offender is very elderly: see,
for instance, Rep v. Mulinganiza Criminal Case No 306 of 2010 – 82
year old offender; Rep v. Ng’ambi [1971-1972] 6 ALR Mal 457 (HC) –
80 year old offender. Cf Rep v. Misomali confirmation Case No 527 of
1996, where a 55-year-old offender was considered to be ‘a responsible
adult’ deserving of no mercy despite the fact that he was a first offend-
er and had pleaded guilty.
28. Rep v. Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010; Rep v. Chavula Con-
firmation Case No 93 of 2005, 5; Patel v. State Criminal Appeal No 81
of 2007. Research indicates that peer pressure is a common factor that
influences older offenders to commit crime: see P. Burton et al., Under-
standing Offenders: Prisoners and Rehabilitation in Malawi (Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies, 2005), at 27.
29. Chitsonga v. Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 88.
178
ELR December 2017 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000087
Masula31 that the consideration in sentencing should
always be the seriousness of the offence. The serious-
ness of an offence can be garnered from the nature of
the offence (the actions and mental component compris-
ing the crime),32 the circumstances in which it was com-
mitted33 and the maximum sentence (which, theoretical-
ly, reflects the public’s view of the offence and is an
indicator of the public interest in a crime because it is
set by parliament as the representative of the public),34
the effect of the crime on society,35 the motive36 and the
modus operandi.37 The pursuit of community protection
and deterrence, especially where the offence is serious,
would also justify a departure from sentencing princi-
ples provided this does not result in an extraordinarily
excessive sentence.38
The High Court has repeatedly held that serious offen-
ces must be punished with long and immediate impris-
onment,39 a principle to be departed from only in
‘extremely rare’ or exceptional circumstances when the
mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors ‘con-
siderably’, such that a court may opt to suspend the sen-
tence or impose a non-custodial one.40 In practice, seri-
ous offenders rarely escape imprisonment even in the
30. Rep v. Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC).
31. Rep v. Masula Criminal Case No 65 of 2008.
32. Rep v. Edisoni Confirmation Case No 421 of 2001. Strict liability is miti-
gating factor: see Mangani v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2007.
33. Rep v. Maele Confirmation Case No 654 of 2001; Rep v. Themule Con-
firmation Case No. 228 of 2002.
34. Rep v. Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998; Rep v. Timba Criminal
Case No 88 of 2009; Rep v. Misomali Confirmation Case No 738 of
2000; Rep v. Cheuka Criminal Case No 73 of 2008. Offences that are
serious by nature include murder, manslaughter, robbery, housebreak-
ing (see William Hassan v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 102 of 2005) and
theft by public servant (see Rep v. Koloko [1995] 2 MLR 723 (HC)).
35. Rep v. Kambalame Criminal Case No of 108 of 2002 (effect of corrup-
tion on economy considered).
36. Rep v. Mbewe [1973-1975] 7 ALR Mal 124 (HC) where the defilement
of a 13-year-old girl in the presence of another person was found not
to have been committed out of lust but aimed at degrading and humil-
iating victim; Nyamatcherenga v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 56 of 2000.
presence of strong mitigating factors,41 more so where
the offence was committed in the most austere of cir-
cumstances.42
37. See for instance Rep v. Tito [1995] 2 MLR 638 (HC); Rep v. Chikazing-
wa [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 160 (HC); Chimenya v. Rep MSCA Crimi-
nal Appeal No 8 of 2006 (SCA) 5. The offence will be aggravated
where the manner in which an offence was committed reveals elements
that show a disposition beyond the ordinary elements or requirements
of the offence portraying a dangerous criminal: see Harry v. Rep Crimi-
nal Appeal No 5 of 2005); Asekwe v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 59 of
2000 (‘peculiar determination and criminal ingenuity’, a ‘real criminal
mind at work’); Rep v. Banda Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999 (vio-
lent and evil person with a high level of criminality evidenced by the
fact that the victims were terrorised and manhandled); Idi v. Rep [1994]
MLR 99 (HC) 102 (19-year-old first offender described as ‘a determined
and dangerous criminal’ after raping his victim while brandishing a
knife). Aggravation of the offence may also be enhanced by the way
the victims were treated by an offender: such as brutality (Chinkango v.
Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2009 (SCA) (victim was brutally
stabbed to death); victim held captive (Rep v. Alick [1997] 2 MLR 73
(HC); Mwale v. Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 5 of 1994); victim threat-
ened, humiliated or injured (Rep v. Mandawala Confirmation Case No
930 of 2003 (victim threatened); Rep v. Layelo Confirmation Case No
577 of 2000; Rep v. Manjeza [1995] 2 MLR 571 (HC) – complainant
was tied up naked and his wife raped ‘in a very disgraceful and revolt-
ing manner’ in the presence of her husband and children; Rep v. Malola
Idi Confirmation Case No 658 of 2000) repeated assaults (Rep v.
Mawaya Confirmation Case No 794 of 2000; Rep v. Makuluni Confir-
mation Case No 276 of 2001; Manuel Peter v. Rep Criminal Appeal No
65 of 2008; Nwangwu v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 11 of 2008 (SCA);
dangerous weapon was carried or actually used (Rep v. Iddi Confirma-
tion Case No 48 of 1998; Rep v. Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC); Rep
v. Chikakuda [1997] 2 MLR 288 (HC) 294; Rep v. Masula Criminal
Case No 65 of 2008; Naison v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 42 of 1996;
Kachimanga v. Rep Criminal Appeal 180 of 2005; Khonje v. Rep Mis-
cellaneous Criminal Case No 41 of 2009; Moses v. Rep Criminal Appeal
No 106 of 2006; Uladi v. Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 5 of 2008
(SCA), 20 years for murder where bare hands used to fight victim; Kwa-
lala v. Rep MSCA Criminal Appeal No 3 of 2008 (SCA); Rep v. Banda
Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999; Rep v. Chalunda Miscellaneous
Criminal Case No 3 of 2008; S v. Silumbu Criminal Case No 39 of 2009,
30 years for murder using s dangerous weapon; Ngulube v. Rep Crimi-
nal Appeal No 35 of 2006 (SCA)); victim tricked into the crime (Wesle
v. Rep [1995] 1 MLR 367 (HC); Rep v. Kamwendo; Rep v. Chida
[1995] 2 MLR 644 (HC); Phiri v. Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 54 of
2007).
38. Banda v. Rep [1990] 13 MLR 56 (SCA); Kamil v. Rep [1973-1974] 7
MLR 169 (SCA); Kumwenda v. Rep (1993) 16(1) MLR 233 (SCA); Rep
v. Katole [1993] 16(1) MLR 472 (HC); Rep v. Phale [1991] 14 MLR
438 (HC); Mpondamwala v. Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 306 (HC).
39. Mtetera v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 88 of 2005; Rep v. Chavula Crimi-
nal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 5; Rep v. Austin Confirmation Case No 1222
of 2003; Rep v. Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 554 of 1996; Rep v.
Mzuzi Confirmation Case No 1607 of 1998.
40. Rep v. Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC) 72; Rep v. Kufandiko Confirma-
tion Case No 126 of 2009.
41. Mussa v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 44 of 1995.
42. See also Rep v. Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC) 601; Rep v. Mtaya
Confirmation Case No 98 of 1995; Phiri v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 6 of
1996; Mbekeani v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 48 of 2006, 20; Lusale v.
Rep Criminal Case No 141 of 2005; Lobo v. Rep Criminal Appeal No
110 of 2008; Rep v. Chavula Confirmation Case No 93 of 2005, 6.
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Offences considered serious include murder, man-
slaughter, robbery,43 burglary,44 housebreaking,45 rape
and theft by servant.46 In some cases, courts have pre-
scribed ‘starting points’ for serious offences flagged for
long and immediate imprisonment. These include rape
(six years),47 robbery, (three48 or four49 years), burglary
and housebreaking (six years)50 arson51 and theft of cat-
tle.52 Shorter sentences are considered more appropriate
for less serious offences such as breaking into a building,
minor cases of sexual indecency, petty frauds, assaults
and other instances of violence causing minor injuries.53
This model of starting points, underscored also by utili-
tarian justifications for punishment, is religiously fol-
lowed in the Sentencing Guidelines which posit quanta of
punishment for myriad offences and a sample of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, which should justify an
upward or lower adjustment depending on the facts of
each cases. This model is manifestly problematic if only
for the reason that it is in direct contrast with the spirit
of Malawian penal law, which generally does not pro-
vide for minimum sentences, but only maximum sen-
tences. The ‘mathematicalisation’ of sentencing that
comes with starting points is hugely awkward. It confu-
ses the pursuit of consistency with uniformity and indi-
rectly creates an unlawful parallel system of discretion-
ary minimum sentences not contemplated by the Legis-
lature. In other words, the application of starting points
effectively sets a standard sentence applicable across the
board unless there is a justification to increase or
decrease the sentence dictated by the starting point. For
instance, a starting point of three years for an offence
means that a court should consider three years as the
basic sentence for that offence and may only depart
from it if the factors tilt in favour of a higher or lesser
sentence. This approach is akin to a system of discre-
tionary mandatory minimum sentences where the law
sets down a particular sentence and gives courts the
power to depart from it if there is proper justification
for doing so. This does not sit very well with Malawian
penal scheme, which generally only provides maximum
43. For instance, it was held in Rep v. Chitembeya that robbery with vio-
lence is a serious offence and offenders deserve severe sentences to
deter them from further committing crimes and to protect society by
keeping them away.
44. Rep v. Misomali Confirmation Case No 527 of 1996.
45. Rep v. Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC); Rep v. Chizumila [1994] MLR
288 (HC); Rep v. Tembo Confirmation Case No 726 of 2000 (irrespec-
tive of the mitigating factors, a simple burglary should be punished with
no less than three years).
46. Rep v. Madando [1995] 2 MLR 733 (HC); Banda v. Rep Criminal
Appeal No 221 of 2009.
47. Rep v. Ndamera Confirmation Case No 314 of 2001. Cf Rep v. Mso-
woya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal (HC) 394 recommending three years as
the starting point for rape if the aggravating factors equal the mitigat-
ing factors.
48. Rep v. Harry [1997] 2 MLR 74 (HC).
49. Rep v. Napulula Confirmation Case No 665 of 2003.
50. Rep v. Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC); Chitsonga v. Rep [1995] 1
MLR 86 (HC); Rep v. Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998.
51. Rep v. Kathumba [1997] 1 MLR 390 (HC) 392; Rep v. Chitseko Confir-
mation Case No 78 of 1997.
52. Rep v. Phiri [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC) 94.
53. Rep v. Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998.
sentences. The provisions simply create a ceiling and
leave it up to the courts to determine what the sentence
must be within that maximum. So, the application of
starting points as advised in Malawi upsets this system.
Laudably, the general principle that serious offences
should be met with long and immediate imprisonment
has been challenged on the basis that it does not duly
accommodate the quest for rehabilitation,54 ignores the
adverse effects of lengthy sentences55 and fails to pro-
mote ‘a deliberate policy of decongesting prisons’,
which calls for short sentences even for serious offences
such as manslaughter, robbery, rape, defilement, bur-
glary, housebreaking, theft of bicycle, theft of livestock
‘and many more to be in the category of serious offen-
ces’.56 The High Court has pointed out that guidelines
that emphasise long imprisonment for serious offences
are skewed because they ignore the importance of refor-
mation of the offender as they only focus on retributive
justice and deterrence without any consideration of the
negative consequences of long sentences both on an
offender and others.57 More recently, courts have been
called upon to exercise more restraint on the use of
immediate imprisonment in sentencing all offences by
not automatically imposing it for offences traditionally
flagged as serious. Mwaungulu J in Rep v. Yasin58 and
Khonje v. Rep59 has urged that in appropriate instances,
offences such as burglary and housebreaking may be
punished with suspended sentences or indeed a non-
custodial sentence altogether. In several cases including
Rep v. Kachaso,60 Kotamu v. Rep,61 Muwamba v. Rep,62
Foster v. Rep63 and Tembo v. Rep,64 the High Court
commended non-custodial sentences for simple theft.
The pursuit of retribution has also seen courts discount-
ing the relevance of certain factors to sentencing. For
instance, the rejection of family obligations as a mitigat-
ing factor is partly based on retribution. Indeed, Chipeta
J in Rep v. Eneya65 emphasised that the consideration of
family obligations may detract a court from imposing
the right sentence by making it focus on the hardship a
sentence may inflict on an offender’s family. Similar
sentiments were expressed by Mwaungulu J earlier in
Chitsonga v. Rep66 who essentially stated that family
54. Rep v. Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC) 359-360.
55. Ibid.
56. Rep v. Limbani Confirmation Case No 839 of 2005, 2. The High Court
has called for greater recognition of poor prison conditions as a mitigat-
ing factor. See Rep v. Banda Sentence Rehearing No 9 of 2016, 4; Rep
v. Khwalala Homicide Sentence Rehearing No 70 of 2015, 4, explaining
that poor prison conditions render imprisonment a ‘double punishment’;
Rep v. Senti Homicide Sentence Rehearing No 25 of 2015, 11, noting
that appalling prison conditions add a layer to imprisonment that consti-
tutes ‘punishment on its own’ and put an offender in ‘double jeopardy’.
57. Rep v. Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC).
58. Rep v. Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012.
59. Khonje v. Rep Miscellaneous Criminal Case No 41 of 2009.
60. Rep v. Kachaso Confirmation Case No 26 of 2012, 6.
61. Rep v. Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012, 6.
62. Rep v. Muwamba Confirmation Case No 247 of 2012, 2.
63. Rep v. Foster Confirmation Case No 1690 of 2005.
64. Rep v. Tembo Confirmation Case No 187 of 2013.
65. Rep v. Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003.
66. Chitsonga v. Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 88.
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hardship as a result of imprisonment is part of the price
to pay when committing a crime.67
Punishment is also aimed at denunciation of certain
conduct. For instance, the court in Rep v. Kaira68 held
that a sentence of three and a half years for defilement
was not enough to reflect public revulsion of the offence
and its seriousness. It noted that courts must be alive to
public sentiments regarding offences and show public
disapproval through the sentences they impose. The
High Court has in fact reasoned that a combined consid-
eration of all the aims of punishment (retribution,
denunciation and deterrence) simply means ‘that courts
must pass meaningful sentences which will not generate
contempt in the eyes of the public. Courts must pass
sentences that will fit the crime, the defendant and also
satisfy the legitimate expectations of the public’.69
Courts have also emphasised retribution by taking
account of public sentiments in sentencing and being
wary of public response to sentences. It was held in Rep
v. Chikuli70 that a victim must ‘derive contentment in
the sentence imposed’. Courts have also been encour-
aged to pass meaningful sentences that will reduce
resort to mob justice on the part of society.71 Madise J
held in Ngulube v. Rep that sentences ‘must reflect the
general feeling of the public’ and ‘must not outrage
members of the general public’.72 Similar sentiments
were expressed by the High Court in Banda v.
Rep,73Rep v. Steshi74 and Phiri v. S.75 The problem is
how to gauge the ‘feelings’ of the general public. There
is also the vexing question of whether judicial officers
are competent enough to determine the feelings of the
general public.
Chombo J in Rep v. Masula76 stated that a sentence
should be of sufficient severity such that ‘right-thinking
members of the public with full knowledge of the rele-
vant facts and circumstances learning of [the] sentence’
should ‘not question the court’s sanity’ or wonder if
‘something had gone wrong with the administration of
justice’. The material issue here is that a sentence
should make sense to ‘right-thinking members’ of soci-
ety who are well appraised of not only the circumstances
of the offence and the offender but also the complexity
of sentences as well as the basic principles of sentencing
including that sentencing is not an exact science. In oth-
er cases, courts do not seem to give much thought to
this matter, most prominently when the need to curb
mob justice is invoked. As a result, they have by and
large responded by imposing harsher sentences to avoid
67. See also Rep v. Asidi Confirmation Case No 955 of 1999.
68. Rep v. Kaira Confirmation Case No 689 of 2003.
69. Rep v. Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005, 4.
70. Rep v. Chikuli Confirmation Case No 174 of 2005.
71. Mulewa v. Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC) 66.
72. Ngulube v. Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 63 of 2011, para 11.1.1.
73. Banda v. Rep Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2011.
74. Rep v. Steshi Criminal Appeal No 7 of 2001.
75. Phiri v. S Criminal Appeal No 63 of 2009.
76. Rep v. Masula Criminal Case No 65 of 2008, 2, citing R v. Fawcett
(1983) 5 Cr App R 158.
mob justice. For instance, in Mulewa v. Rep77 the High
Court remarked:
Apart from other things, there is a perception that
the increase in the number of [burglary] offences
could only have come about because of the sentences
that courts impose. Whether this perception is right
or not, the public has resorted to mob justice, burn-
ing to death, not bringing to the courts, those that
offend. It is a reaction, uncivil though it is, which can
only be matched by an adjustment in our sentencing
policy. This court has, therefore, for these reasons
and many others approved of longer and immediate
imprisonment.
Similar sentiments were expressed in Rep v. Chizumila
where it was observed that mob justice is a result of
public dissatisfaction with lenient sentences.78 Again in
Rep v. Nkhoma,79 the High Court agreed with the trial
court’s observation linking mob justice attacks where
suspected thieves had been burnt to death to lenient
sentences. As I have argued elsewhere, mob justice can-
not be resolved by enhanced sentences.80
5 Do All Offenders ‘Deserve’
to Be Punished?
As noted earlier, the retribution’s claim that offenders
deserve to be punished is not entirely correct.81 In
Malawi, this is borne out by a couple of provisions in
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code (CPEC),82
which prescribe various ‘orders in lieu of punishment’.
These orders include reconciliation processes, binding
over (or orders to find security), discharge, probation
and dismissal. Reconciliation processes are provided for
in Section 161 of the CPEC. With regard to binding
over, a court may order an offender to enter into a bond
‘to keep the peace and be of good behaviour’ for a speci-
fied period not exceeding one year.83 If the bond is bro-
ken, the bond may be forfeited in accordance with Sec-
tion 125 of the CPEC. The aim of binding over is to
promote peace in the community and deter an offender
from re-offending.
Discharge, probation84 and dismissal may only be
imposed where
77. Mulewa v. Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC) 66. See also Rep v. Nkhoma
Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 where the High Court agreed with the
trial court’s observation linking mob justice attacks where suspected
thieves have been burnt to death to lenient sentences.
78. Rep v. Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 306.
79. Rep v. Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996.
80. See E. Gumboh, ‘The Application of Deterrence in Sentencing in Mala-
wi’, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (forthcoming).
81. See Section 1.2 above.
82. See section 377 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, Chapter
8:01 of the laws of Malawi.
83. Section 338(1) of the CPEC.
84. Malawi does not have a functioning probation system for adult offend-
ers.
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the court thinks that the charge is proved but is of the
opinion that, having regard to the youth, old age,
character, antecedents, home surroundings, health or
mental condition of the accused, or to the fact that the
[offender] has not previously committed an offence,
or to the nature of the offence, or to the extenuating
circumstances in which the offence was committed, it
is inexpedient to inflict any punishment …85
Discharge may be absolute or on condition that an
offender refrains from committing further offences dur-
ing a period of up to 12 months.86 Probation may be
imposed on various conditions in order to prevent a rep-
etition of the same offence or the commission of other
offences.87 Conditional discharge and probation may be
considered as postponed sentences since an offender will
be liable to sentence if he breaches the conditions set by
a court.88 Section 337(5) of the CPEC requires that a
court must warn the accused of this consequence. These
orders act as deterrents because the possibility of receiv-
ing a sentence may act as an incentive for an offender to
abide by the bond conditions and refrain from commit-
ting further offences. An order of dismissal of a charge
is also aimed at deterrence. Since it is mandatory that a
caution or admonition must be given in cases of dismiss-
al,89 dismissal acts as a warning to an accused, thereby
creating a possibility that he will refrain from commit-
ting further crimes. Courts usually dismiss charges in
dealing with minor offences committed in extenuating
circumstances. Dismissal would also be appropriate for
offences of vagrancy, loitering (or being an idle and dis-
orderly person), nuisances by drunken persons and oth-
er offences, which are in fact more properly seen as
social problems than criminal behaviour.
It may well be argued that Section 337 is a reaffirmation
of well-established sentencing principles in as far as
aggravating and mitigating factors are concerned. How-
ever, the provision depicts a departure from sentencing
principles and retribution in that it allows a court to
consider the relevant sentencing factors in the alterna-
tive and make an order that may otherwise be seen as
manifestly inadequate and even outright offensive. This
is evident from the wording of the opening paragraph of
Section 337(1), which details that the orders are only
applicable where a court is of the view that ‘it is inexpe-
dient to inflict any punishment’ in view of a list of miti-
gating factors, namely,
youth, old age, character, antecedents, home sur-
roundings, health or mental condition of the accused,
or to the fact that the offence has not previously com-
mitted an offence, or to the nature of the offence, or
85. Section 337(1) of the CPEC. Emphasis supplied. See also section 24 of
the Local Courts Act providing for a similar provision in relation to local
courts.
86. Section 337(1)(b) of the CPEC.
87. See Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, Chapter 9:01 of the
Laws of Malawi.
88. Section 341(1) of the CPEC.
89. Rep v. Ng’oma Confirmation Case No 988 of 2007.
to the extenuating circumstances in which the offence
was committed.90
Ordinarily, retribution dictates that mitigating factors
cannot be considered independently of the seriousness
of an offence; the significance of mitigating factors is
diminished when the offence is very serious. However,
Section 337 makes it possible for a court to isolate miti-
gating factors from the seriousness of an offence. This is
well demonstrated in the recent case of Rep v. Mulinga-
niza91 where an 82-year-old terminally ill murder con-
vict was discharged. Kamwambe J, noting that impris-
onment would be an inappropriate penalty in the cir-
cumstances, said that it was
concerned with the welfare of the convict and this is
the time that the court should be enticed to employ
humanitarian considerations as the circumstances
dictate or demand. This is the whole purpose of sec-
tion 337 of the [Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Code] which should be considered and facts in issue
examined regardless of the seriousness of the offence.
The court cannot afford to be impersonal, for if it
were so, then genuine justice would fail to be
attained.92
Even more recently, Kamwambe J in Rep v. Kampira93
again discharged an offender convicted of manslaughter.
Mindful of the seriousness of the offence, the court
remarked:
The sentence I am intending to impose on the con-
vict may seem to be novel and ridiculous for one who
has taken away a person’s life but, considering the
circumstances stated above [that the accused is a first
offender aged only 27 years at the time of committing
the offence], it is the appropriate sentence. We do not
only look at the seriousness or nature of the offence
but also the circumstances surrounding the crime. It
is imperative for me to consider section 337(1)(b) of
the [CPEC] which I have rarely applied … The con-
vict is a first offender who I noticed to be genuinely
remorseful. He did not just plead guilty before this
court but he admitted to murder when he was charg-
ed by the police. This shows how cooperative and
remorseful he was. He is of youthful age at 29 now …
In my mind there is some sort of obscurity or uncer-
tainness as to the actual cause of death. In fact, the
deceased contributed greatly to his own death
…
In view of what I have stated above, I discharge the
convict forthwith under section 337(1)(b) of the
CPEC.94
90. Section 337(1) of the CPEC.
91. Rep v. Mulinganiza Criminal Case No 306 of 2010.
92. Rep v. Mulinganiza Criminal Case No 306 of 2010, 7. Emphasis sup-
plied.
93. Rep v. Kampira Homicide Case No 61 of 2015.
94. Rep v. Kampira Homicide Case No 61 of 2015, 4-6.
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While neither Mulinganiza nor Kampira are immune
from criticism regarding the sentences imposed, they
show that Section 337 permits a court to focus on the
circumstances of an offender in deciding how to deal
with him. This depicts allowance for completely non-
retributive ways of dealing with offenders. Further, it
recognises that crime may be influenced by social factors
such as home surroundings. In practice, Section 337
orders are reserved for minor offences committed in
extenuating circumstances. Indeed, the author is
unaware of instances other than Mulinganiza and Kam-
pira where these orders were imposed for felonies other
than theft simpliciter.
6 Conclusion
Retribution is hailed for recognising that wilful wrong-
doing is the foundation for punishment and for its
emphasis on the principle of proportionality, which
requires that punishment must be commensurate with
the seriousness of an offence. However, retribution is
problematic in that it fails to give concrete meaning to
what the principle of proportionality actually entails. It
also does not take into account the fact that social factors
influence criminal behaviour and cannot effectively deal
with crime because it largely rejects the fact that punish-
ment may be imposed to achieve certain goals in the
interest of the public. Despite these weaknesses, retri-
bution remains a relevant theory because, among other
things, it embodies an important distributive principle
of punishment, which should guide the imposition of
punishment, namely that punishment must reflect the
gravity of the offence. However, a penal system must
also look to utilitarian theories of punishment such as
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation if it is to be
a meaningful sentencing policy.
Ultimately, it can be said that retribution rightly plays a
pivotal role in Malawian sentencing jurisprudence by
elevating the principle of proportionality to the most
important principle in sentencing. However, there are
still some challenges in how this principle is applied in
practice. Admirably, Malawian courts have also noted
that whether in pursuit of retribution or utilitarianism,
the ultimate objective is to arrive at a sentence that is
just and fair in relation to the crime and the offender.
This ensures that sentences do not offend the prohibi-
tion of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. If
taken seriously, the principle espoused by Mwaungulu J
in Pose and Keke is the key to principled sentencing in a
constitutional democracy like Malawi, which prides
itself in having a Bill of Rights with a plethora of protec-
tions for offenders. Sentencing is, after all, a human
rights issue.95
95. L. Kurki, ‘International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment’, in M.
Tonry and R.S. Frase (eds.), Sentencing in Western Countries (2001), at
331.
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